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You Gotta Fight for the Right to BAR-GAIN: How the Supreme Court ruling in Janus v.
AFSCME could undermine the Exclusive Bargaining Rights of Public Sector Unions
Christina Zarcone
Part I: Introduction
The Supreme Court decision in Janus v. AFSCME shook the foundation of labor law in
this country to its core. After forty years, the Supreme Court overruled the constitutionality of
unions’ mandatory agency fees, established in Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ.1 , on the basis that
they violated the First Amendment right to freedom of association. 2 In the past, the Court had
failed to apply the heightened scrutiny standard to First Amendment claims against labor unions’
right to agency fees and exclusive representation, choosing to apply a deferential standard of
review akin to rational basis.3 The controversial nature of agency fees results from the fact that
they

are

chargeable

to

non-union

members

for activities

associated

solely

with

collective bargaining, as opposed to activities related to a "union's political and ideological
projects."4 In Janus, the Supreme Court ruled that heightened scrutiny is the appropriate standard
for First Amendment claims5 but, ironically, failed to apply the test, arguing that the more lenient
standard was enough to declare agency fees unconstitutional. 6
Putting aside the tremendous implications of that decision on unions’ purses, it now
remains unclear whether the decision in Janus will also affect associations’ exclusive bargaining
rights.7 Section 9 (a) of the National Labor Relations Act provides that a union that wins a

1

Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2456 (2018).
3 Clay Calvert, Selecting Scrutiny in Compelled-Speech Cases Involving Non-Commercial Expression: The
Formulaic Landscape of a Strict Scrutiny World After Becerra and Janus, and a First Amendment Interests and
Values Alternative, 31 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 1, 8.
4 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2461.
5 Id. at 2456.
6 Id.
7 Kate Andrias, Janus’s Two Faces, 2018 Sup. Ct. Rev. 21, 49-50.
2

2

representation (certification) election is the exclusive bargaining agent for all of the workers in the
bargaining unit.8 First Amendment complications arise because the union holds the exclusive right
to represent all the workers in the bargaining unit, including those who have opted not to join the
union itself and do not desire the use of its services.9 Interestingly enough, the Court in Janus
chose not to discuss the precedent case supporting the constitutionality of exclusive representation
rights, Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colleges v. Knight10 , but its reasoning, which overruled Abood v.
Detroit Bd. of Educ., as well as its assertions that heightened scrutiny should apply in First
Amendment association and speech cases, does call into question the reasoning applied in
Knight.11 For the first time in over three decades it seems possible that, if unions’ exclusive
bargaining rights are subjected to the heightened scrutiny standard applicable to First Amendment
claims, such rights may be found unconstitutional.12
Part II of this comment will provide a background overview of the First Amendment rights
to freedom of speech and freedom of association as well as the definition of the heightened scrutiny
standard and its impact on First Amendment violations. Part III will provide an in-depth analysis
of how the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment right to the freedoms of
association and speech led to the overruling of Abood under Janus. Part IV will examine the
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colleges v. Knight which established the
constitutionality of unions’ exclusive bargaining rights, which remain in effect today, as well as
the flurry of post-Janus litigation attacking said right. Finally, Part V of this comment will look

8

29 U.S.C. §§ 159.
Charles W Baird, Labor Law and the First Amendment, 1985 Cato Journal, vol. 5, 203, 211.
10 Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271 (1984).
11 Thompson v. Marietta Educ. Ass'n, 371 F. Supp. 3d 431, 437 (2019).
12 Trevor Burrus & Michael Collins, The Coming Battle over Exclusive Representation (Feb. 26, 2020, 2:21 PM),
CATO INSTITUTE, https://www.cato.org/blog/coming-battle-over-exclusive-representation.
9
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to the future and discuss the possibility of the Supreme Court overturning exclusive representation
rights based on the heightened standard applied in Janus.
Part II: Constitutional background on the right to freedom of speech and freedom of
association
At the forefront of this constitutional discussion is the all-important First Amendment
itself. The Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances.”13 Infringement upon this bedrock of American liberty has required the courts to
apply a heightened standard of scrutiny to opposing government interests.14 Most importantly,
when heightened scrutiny is chosen as the applicable standard, it usually signals a death knell for
the statute in question, especially in the arena of First Amendment rights.15 This is because under
strict scrutiny, the government must prove two things: (1) a compelling interest in regulating
speech, and (2) that its regulation is narrowly tailored to serve that interest such that no more
speech is restricted than is absolutely necessary. 16 Thus, not only must the government’s interest
be of utmost significance, but there must also be a "direct causal link" between the regulated speech

13

U.S. Const. amend. I.
Calvert, supra note 3, at 14.
15 See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2234 (2015) (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that strict scrutiny
leads "to almost certain legal condemnation"); United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 731 (2012) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (contending strict scrutiny yields "near-automatic condemnation").
16 See McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 478 (2014) (providing that to pass strict scrutiny review, a statute "must
be the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling state interest"); Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 564 U.S. at
799 (noting that a law passes strict scrutiny if "it is justified by a compelling government interest and is narrowly
drawn to serve that interest"); United States v. Playboy Enm't. Group, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (noting that under
strict scrutiny, "[i]f a less restrictive alternative would serve the Government's purpose, the legislature must use that
alternative").
14
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and the harm it allegedly produces.17 The second part of the test requires the “fit between the
statutory means and the compelling interest…be the least speech-restrictive avenue.”18
In his majority opinion in Janus, Justice Alito reinforced the importance of free speech and
furthered reasoned that compelled speech is just as threatening to First Amendment rights because
it forces people "to endorse ideas they find objectionable," therefore, establishing heightened
scrutiny as the appropriate test in compelled speech cases and forecasting the likelihood exclusive
bargaining rights will receive near automatic condemnation. 19
Before presenting the cases outlining the constitutional principles established above, it is
important to note that while the First Amendment only protects people from actions by the federal
government, the Fourteenth Amendment, has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to apply the
Bill of Rights Amendments to state actors as well. 20

Part III: How the First Amendment Right to Freedom of Association led to the Overruling
of Abood under Janus:
A. Abood v. Janus: an overview
Janus was the culmination of a years-long effort to limit the funds available to labor unions
by removing their ability to collect fees from employees whom they are mandated by law to
represent.21 These fair share fees are part of the collective bargaining infrastructure established by
Congress for private sector employees under the National Labor Relations Act 22 and subsequently

17

Brown, 564 U.S. at 799.
Calvert, supra note 3, at 13.
19 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2464.
20 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
21 American Constitution Society: Janus Aftermath: https://www.acslaw.org/wp -content/uploads/2020/02/Janus-v.AFSCME-An-Ongoing-Assault-on-Public-Sector-Unions.pdf page 2.
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29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166
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adopted by many state legislatures for state and local government employees. 23 Under the system
of exclusive representation, unions chosen by a majority of employees represent all of the
employees in the collective bargaining unit and must represent these employees in good faith and
without discrimination, whether those employees are members of the union or not.24
Where state law so authorizes, unions can require all employees to pay representation fees,
with the caveat they only be used for collective bargaining and contract administration and not for
any of the union’s political activities.25 The Abood Court recognized that while these fair share
fees might impact the First Amendment interests of employees, the fee requirement is justified by
the government’s interest in maintaining solid labor relations and ensuring there are no “free
riders” benefitting from unions’ collective bargaining activities without paying for them. 26
Following Abood, anti-union organizations and individuals continued to attack fair share
fees over the next thirty odd years.27 This onslaught culminated in Janus, where the Court held
the government’s interests in stable labor relations to be an insufficient justification for the burden
placed on the First Amendment rights of dissenting workers forced to pay for unwanted union
representation.28
i. Abood
In Abood, public school teachers in Detroit, Michigan, filed class actions against the Detroit
Board of Education after the teachers’ union entered into a collective bargaining agreement which
contained an agency shop clause requiring every teacher who had not become a union member to

23

Id.
Id.
25 Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235–36 (1977).
26 Janus Aftermath, supra note 21, at 2.
27 See, e.g., Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507 (1991) (determining whether certain expenses were
chargeable to fee payers); Chi. Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986) (finding union
procedures for employees to challenge chargeable fees insufficient to meet constitutional requiremen ts).
28 Janus Aftermath, supra note 21, at 2-3
24
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pay the union a service charge equal to the regular dues required of union members. 29 The
complaint alleged that the union was engaged in a variety of ideological activities of which
plaintiffs did not approve, and sought to have the agency-shop clause declared invalid as a violation
of their freedom of association protected by United States Constitution.30
In its holding, the Court relied on the National Labor Relations Act which leaves the
regulation of the labor relations of state and local governments to the states.31 In Michigan, any
union that obtains the support of a majority of employees in the appropriate bargaining unit is
designated the exclusive representative of those employees.32 All designated unions are under a
duty of fair representation to all employees within the unit, whether or not they are union members.
Michigan law further allows unions to have an agency-shop clause to better fund the carrying out
of all its various responsibilities.33
Abood ultimately held agency fees to be constitutional but made a distinction between dues
collected for the purposes of bargaining and fair representation and those used for political
purposes:
A state-authorized "agency shop" arrangement between a local government
employer and a union representing local government employees, whereby every
employee represented by the union, even though not a union member, must pay to
the union, as a condition of employment, a service fee equal in amount to union
dues, does not violate the First and Fourteenth Amendment freedom of expression
and association rights of employees who object to public sector unions, or to
various union activities, insofar as the service charges are used to finance union
expenditures for the purposes of collective bargaining, contract administration, and
grievance adjustment…. however, it is unconstitutional for a union to use service
charges for political and ideological purposes which are unrelated to collective
bargaining and as to which an employee objects, and objecting employees may
constitutionally prevent the union's spending a part of their required service fees to

29

Abood, 431 U.S. at 211.
Id.
31 Id. citing 29 U.S.C.S. § 152(2)
32 Mich. Comp. Laws § 423.211 (1970).
33 Id.
30
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contribute to political candidates and to express political views unrelated to its
duties as exclusive bargaining representative. 34
The Court maintained that a union has a duty as the exclusive representative of employees
to fairly and equitably represent all employees in the unit and, therefore, forcing employees to
financially support their bargaining agent is constitutionally justified “as long as the union acts to
promote the cause which justified bringing the group together.”35 The Court also upheld the First
Amendment rights of non-members as well, finding that while the First Amendment does not
prohibit a union from spending funds for the expression of political views, it does require such
expenditures be financed from dues paid by union members. 36
Failing to find an adequate government interest to support non-member payment of fees
for political purposes, the Court created a scheme to draw a fine line between non-members’
agency fees used for bargaining and representation versus those for political purposes and called
for (1) an injunction against expenditures for political causes opposed by the plaintiff-employees,
(2) restitution of a portion of the funds exacted from the plaintiffs in the proportion that union
political expenditures opposed by the plaintiffs bear to total union expenditures, and (3) the
reduction of future exactions by the same proportion. 37
Significant to our contemporary look at agency fees, the Court did not apply a heightened
scrutiny standard in its analysis of agency fee constitutionality.38 The only allusion to an applicable
standard came from the Court’s conclusion that the State had provided adequate interests:
maintaining stable labor relations and preventing free riders. 39

34

Abood, 431 U.S. at 211.
Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Abood, 431 U.S. at 259 citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976).
39 Janus Aftermath, supra note 21, at 2.
35
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ii. Janus
In Janus, the Court historically overruled Abood, holding that the State's extraction of
agency fees from nonconsenting public-sector employees violated the First Amendment right to
freedom of association.40 Petitioner Mark Janus, an Illinois state employee whose bargaining unit
represents a public-sector union, refused to join the union because he opposed many of its
positions, including those taken in collective bargaining, and filed suit challenging the
constitutionality of the state law authorizing agency fees. 41
Under Illinois state law, upheld in Abood, employees who decline to join the union are not
assessed full union dues but must pay a portion of union dues attributable to activities relevant to
collective-bargaining and fair representation that are separate from the funding of political
activities.42

Petitioner’s complaint alleged that all “nonmember fee deductions are coerced

political speech” and “the First Amendment forbids coercing any money from the nonmembers.”43
The Court upheld Janus’s claims, pronouncing “the First Amendment, made applicable to the
States by the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids abridgment of the freedom of speech. We have held
time and again that freedom of speech includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain
from speaking at all…. The right to eschew association for expressive purposes is likewise
protected.”44 The Court found traditional support in the Founders Fathers by quoting Thomas
Jefferson: “to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions
which he disbelieves and abhor[s] is sinful and tyrannical.”45

40

Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2456.
Id. at 2455-56.
42 Id. at 2460-61
43 Id. at 2462
44 Id. at 2463
45 Id. citing A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, in 2 Papers of Thomas Jefferson 545 (J. Boyd ed. 1950).
41
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The Court declared the reasoning in Abood to be poor, finding it responsible for abuses
inconsistent with other First Amendment cases.46 The holding specified that “forcing free and
independent individuals to endorse ideas they find objectionable raises serious First
Amendment concerns which includes compelling a person to subsidize the speech of other private
speakers, concerns which traditionally require that a strict scrutiny be applied in judging
constitutionality.”47 However, in an interesting turn of events, the Court then chose not to apply
strict or heightened scrutiny, maintaining that even under the more permissive “exacting” standard,
mandatory agency fees cannot survive.48
The union’s legal justifications for agency fees were dismissed as outdated. The Court
found that agency fees cannot be upheld on the ground they are necessary to promote “labor peace”
because there are twenty-eight states with laws prohibiting agency fees and, within those states,
millions of public employees are represented by unions that effectively serve as the exclusive
representatives of all the employees.49 The Court was also not compelled by the State’s argument
that it was against the union’s interests to represent non-members, because the representation of
non-members actually furthers the union’s interest since the resolution of one employee’s
grievance can affect others.50 The Court struck down the last pillar holding up Abood by finding
the extraction of agency fees from non-members to avoid the risk of “free riders” is “not a
compelling state interest and is generally insufficient to overcome First Amendment objections.”51
The Court reasoned that requiring unions to represent aforementioned “free-riders” is merely a
byproduct of the authority that comes with exclusive representative of all the employees in a

46

Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2463.
Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 2556-57
50 Id. at 2468.
51 Id. at 2557
47
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bargaining unit.52

Finally, the Court historically concluded that public-sector agency-shop

arrangements violate the First Amendment, and Abood erred in concluding otherwise.53
Aside from the obvious profound impact Janus has had on the operation of public sector
unions, this decision, while not establishing any direct connection between its holding and
exclusive bargaining rights, has laid the foundation to question the legitimacy of that all-tooimportant union stronghold.54 This is most apparent in the Court’s conclusion that preventing freeriders is not a compelling government interest.55 Even after establishing heightened scrutiny as
the appropriate test, and then subsequently failing to apply it to the case at hand, the Court inserted
language strictly applied to the heightened scrutiny standard, insinuating that when First
Amendment violations are at stake, the government must provide a compelling interest.56
Furthermore, writing for the majority, Justice Alito noted that while First Amendment cases
usually involve restrictions on what can be said, “measures compelling speech are at least as
threatening” and he thus laid the constitutional groundwork for claims against the separate union
right as the sole bargainers within their unit.57 Justice Alito also made an incendiary comment
directly pertaining to exclusive bargaining when he commented, “[i]t is also not disputed that the
State may require that a union serve as exclusive bargaining agent for its employees—itself a
significant impingement on associational freedoms that would not be tolerated in other contexts,”
thus leaving the door open for future litigation attacking that pillar of labor law.58

Part IV: The Constitutionality of Unions’ Exclusive Bargaining Rights
52

Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2469.
Id. at 2478.
54 Burrus & Collins, supre note 12.
55 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2469.
56 Id. at 2557.
57 Id. at 2464
58 Id.
53
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A. In depth Look at Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colleges v. Knight
The constitutional foundation of a union’s right to exclusive representation was solidly
established in the holding of Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colleges v. Knight and remains in effect
today.59 In 1971, the Minnesota Legislature adopted the Public Employment Labor Relations Act
(PELRA) to establish "orderly and constructive relationships between all public employers and
their employees . . . ."60 PELRA provides for the division of public employees into appropriate
bargaining units and establishes a procedure, based on majority support within a unit, for the
designation of an exclusive bargaining agent for that unit. 61 The statute requires public employers
to "meet and negotiate" with exclusive representatives concerning the "terms and conditions of
employment," which the statute defines to mean "the hours of employment, the compensation
therefor . . . , and the employer's personnel policies affecting the working conditions of the
employees."62 PELRA also grants professional employees the right to "meet and confer" with
their employers on matters related to employment that are outside the scope of mandatory
negotiations.63 If employees in an appropriate bargaining unit have an exclusive representative to
"meet and negotiate" with their employer, that representative serves as the "meet and confer"

59

See Grossman v. Haw. Gov't Emps. Ass'n/AFSCME Local 152, 382 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1091 (D. Haw. 2019);
Reisman v. Associated Faculties of Univ. of Me., 356 F. Supp. 3d 173 (D. Me. 2018), aff'd, 939 F.3d 409 (1st Cir.
2019); Sweet v. Cal. Ass'n of Psychiatric Technicians, No. 2:19–CV–00349–JAM–AC, 2019 WL 4054105, at *2–*4
(E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2019); Thompson v. Marietta Educ. Ass'n, No. 2:18 –CV–628, 2019 WL 6336825, at *7 (S.D.
Ohio Nov. 26, 2019) (stating that every court to consider the issue has found the claim s foreclosed by Knight),
appeal docketed, No. 19–4217 (6th Cir. 2019); Uradnik v. Inter Faculty Org., No. 18 -1895 (PAM/LIB), 2018 WL
4654751 (D. Minn. Sept. 27, 2018), aff’d, No. 18-3086 (8th Cir. Dec. 3, 2018), cert. denied, April 21, 2019. See also
Hendrickson, 2020 WL 365041, at *9 (finding that “while the ultimate issue the Knight Court considered does not
squarely align with the issue presented here, the Court finds that language in the decision is directly on point and
dispositive of this claim”).
60 Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 273 (1984).
61 Minn. Stat. §§ 179.67, 179.71, 179.741.
62 Minn. Stat. §§ 179.63, 179.67, 179.71.
63 Minn. Stat. §§ 179.63, 179.65.
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representative as well, and the employer may neither "meet and negotiate" nor "meet and confer"
with any members of that bargaining unit except through their exclusive representative. 64
Following enactment of PELRA, the appellant in Knight, the Minnesota Community
College Faculty Association (MCCFA), was designated the exclusive representative of the faculty
of the State's community colleges, which had been deemed a single bargaining unit. 65 Appellees
claimed PERLA infringed on the First and Fourteenth Amendment speech and association rights
of faculty who did not join the union because the MCCFA held the right to select the faculty
representatives for the "meet and confer" committees exclusively from its own members.66 The
Court, however, ruled that the meet and confer sessions did not qualify as “public forums” and
appellees, therefore, had no constitutional right to make their voices heard in those proceedings by
forcing the government to listen to their views.67
The Court furthered defended the exclusive bargaining rights of unions from First
Amendment attacks, explaining that appellees' associational and speech freedoms were not
infringed upon because they were not required to become members of MCCFA, and so, had not
been unconstitutionally denied an opportunity to participate in their public employer's making of
policy.6869 The holding did not require the Court to apply the heightened scrutiny test against a
First Amendment violation because no violation had occurred due to individuals’ voluntary
decision not to join the union in the first place.70 In fact, the Court went as far as to say there was
no associational issues because Appellees were "free to form whatever advocacy groups they

64

Minn. Stat. § 179.66, subd. 7.
Knight, 465 U.S. at 275-276.
66 Id. at 278-79
67 Id. at 280-83
68 Id. at 289.
69 Id. at 292
70 Id. at 289.
65
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like."71 And yet, as the reasoning laid out in Janus establishes, albeit indirectly, that conclusion is
not as clear cut as it once was.72
B. Post-Janus Challenges to Exclusive Representation
After the Janus ruling dismantled one of the pillars of collective bargaining in the United
States, the organizations that succeeded in its removal began mounting challenges against
exclusive representation.73 Thus far, plaintiffs have been unsuccessful despite Alito’s statement
in Janus’ dicta that “[i]t is also not disputed that the State may require that a union serve as
exclusive bargaining agent for its employees—itself a significant impingement on associational
freedoms that would not be tolerated in other contexts.” 74 Seizing on this language, plaintiffs have
argued exclusive representation violates their right to freedom of association by forcing them to
be represented by a union they do not desire.75 As previously mentioned, these efforts to
distinguish Knight or to argue that Janus overruled, or at least undermined, Knight have, thus far,
not succeeded,76 and the Supreme Court has denied certiorari to several related cases since Janus
was decided.77

71

Knight, 465 U.S. at 289.
Burrus & Collins, supre note 12.
73 Janus Aftermath, supra note 21, at 12.
72

74

Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2478.
Janus Aftermath, supra note 21, at 13.
76 See Grossman v. Haw. Gov't Emps. Ass'n/AFSCME Local 152, 382 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1091 (D. Haw. 2019);
Reisman v. Associated Faculties of Univ. of Me., 356 F. Supp. 3d 173 (D. Me. 2018), aff'd, 939 F.3d 409 (1st Cir.
2019); Sweet v. Cal. Ass'n of Psychiatric Technicians, No. 2:19 –CV–00349–JAM–AC, 2019 WL 4054105, at *2–*4
(E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2019); Thompson v. Marietta Educ. Ass'n, No. 2:18 –CV–628, 2019 WL 6336825, at *7 (S.D.
Ohio Nov. 26, 2019) (stating that every court to consider the issue has found the claims foreclosed by Knight),
appeal docketed, No. 19–4217 (6th Cir. 2019); Uradnik v. Inter Faculty Org., No. 18 -1895 (PAM/LIB), 2018 WL
4654751 (D. Minn. Sept. 27, 2018), aff’d, No. 18-3086 (8th Cir. Dec. 3, 2018), cert. denied, April 21, 2019. See also
Hendrickson, 2020 WL 365041, at *9 (holding “while the ultimate issue the Knight Court considered does not
squarely align with the issue presented here, the Court finds that language in the decision is directly on point and
dispositive of this claim”).
77 See Bierman v. Dayton, 900 F.3d 570 (8th Cir. 2018) (raising a constitutional challenge to exclusive
representation for home care workers following Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (201 4)), cert. denied sub nom.
Bierman v. Walz, 139 S. Ct. 2043 (2019); Mentele v. Inslee, 916 F.3d 783 (9th Cir.) (same), cert. denied sub nom.
Miller v. Inslee, 140 S. Ct. 114 (2019); Uradnik v. Inter Faculty Org., No. CV 18 –1895 (PAM/LIB), 2018 WL
4654751 (D. Minn. Sept. 27, 2018), aff’d, No. 18–3086 (8th Cir. Dec. 3, 2018), cert. denied, April 21, 2019.
75
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Interestingly enough, non-members are not the only ones making First Amendment
violations in the wake of Janus.78 While it may be obvious why many unions prefer to represent
all employees in their bargaining unit to maintain exclusivity, some have taken the position that
they have a First Amendment right not to be forced to represent employees who are unwilling to
pay their fair share.79 It appears, following Janus’ holding that the “free-rider” argument does not
qualify as a compelling government interest, some unions are turning the tables, using it as the
basis for their own First Amendment claims.80 Last February, IUOE Local 150 filed suit against
the state of Illinois alleging, among other claims, that the provisions of the Illinois Public Labor
Relations Act requiring Local 150 to represent non-members who refuse to compensate the union
for its services, violate its First Amendment rights.81 While the district court for the Northern
District of Illinois did dismiss some related counts, it recognized that Janus had placed the union
in the position of being compelled by its legal duty of fair representation to speak on behalf of nonpaying non-members, an issue ripe for resolution.82
The current litigation proves, at the very least, that Janus raises the possibility that
exclusive representation could be deemed unconstitutional. After all, “if compelled union fees in
the public sector constitute an incurable First Amendment harm, why d oesn't compelling a
dissenter to be bound by the agreement of a union with which it disagrees?” 83 Justice Alito’s
characterization of the state's requirement that a union serve as an exclusive bargaining agent for

78

Ronald J. Kramer, Janus One Year Later: Litigation Has Come, (July 23, 2019), AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/state_local_government/publications/state_local_law_news/2018 19/summer/janus-one-year-later-litigation-has-come/
79

Kramer, supra note 78.
Kramer, supra note 78.
81 Kramer, supra note 78.
80

82
83

Sweeney v. Madigan, 359 F. Supp. 3d 585 (N.D. Ill. 2019).
Andrias, supra note 7, at 49.
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its employees has not, thus far, led lower courts to read Janus so broadly, mainly because the
Janus Court did not expressly draw Knight into question, which upheld exclusive representation
against First Amendment challenges.84 In fact, Janus spent several pages making clear that the
argument that "designation of a union as exclusive representative of all employees in a unit and
the exaction of agency fees are [not] inextricably linked."85 But, the flood of litigation interpreting
Alito’s dicta on unions’ exclusive bargaining rights and its relationship to rights protected by the
First Amendment says otherwise.

i. Non-members’ First Amendment claims against unions’ exclusive bargaining rights
In 2018, a group of Minnesota parents, who provided homecare services to their disabled
children, sued several state officials and a union, alleging that a 2013 statute extend ing the
state's Public Employment Labor Relations Act ("PELRA") to persons who provide in-home care
to disabled Medicaid recipients violated the homecare providers' freedom of association under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments.86 The appellants in Bierman v. Dayton complained that
PERLA unconstitutionally compelled them to associate with the exclusive negotiating
representative, but the district court, relying on Knight, determined that the 2013 statute does not
infringe on the providers' First Amendment rights.87 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit found that there was no meaningful distinction between this case and Knight
because the current version of PELRA allows the homecare providers to form their own advocacy
groups independent of the exclusive representative, and does not require any provider to join the
union; therefore, the State has "in no way" impinged on the providers' right not to associate by

84

Andrias, supra note 7, at 50.
Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2465.
86 Bierman v. Dayton, 900 F.3d 570, 572 (2018).
87 Id.
85
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recognizing an exclusive negotiating representative.88 The Eighth Circuit explained that because
Janus did not directly address the constitutionality of exclusive representation, it could not be read
to change the outcome.89 The court held that where a precedent like Knight has direct application
in a case, it should be followed, “even if a later decision arguably undermines some of its
reasoning.”90
Following Bierman, in Uradnik v. Inter Faculty Org., plaintiff argued that the exclusive
representation provisions of PELRA violated her First Amendment rights to freedom of speech
and association because the government was compelling her speech by allowing the union to speak
on her behalf as the faculty's exclusive representative. 91 Even though Uradnik’s case was almost
identical to that in Bierman, Plaintiff argued that her status as a full-time public employee made
her situation more akin to the Plaintiff in Janus, thus attempting to distance her claim from the
unsatisfactory decision in Bierman.92 Plaintiff argued that, based on Janus, the heightened scrutiny
standard applies

in

compelled

speech

cases,

but the court countered

that even

if Knight and Bierman did not preclude Plaintiff's compelled speech argument, PELRA would
pass the required level of constitutional scrutiny for compelled speech, which is, in fact, the
exacting standard and not heightened scrutiny.93 In Janus, the Supreme Court declined to answer
the scrutiny question definitively, stating: "we again find it unnecessary to decide the issue of strict
scrutiny because the [law in question] cannot survive under even the more permissive standard
[exacting scrutiny]."94

Other Supreme Court decisions considering compelled speech and
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association have used exacting scrutiny, or a version of exacting scrutiny as the standard,95 but,
confusingly, the decision to do so is in direct conflict with Alito’s comments in Janus’ dicta. Under
the Janus definition of exacting scrutiny, a statute compelling speech must "serve a compelling
state interest that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational
freedoms."96 The district court applied the exacting scrutiny analysis and found that PELRA serves
a compelling state interest because it provides Minnesota's public sector employees with
representation and greater bargaining power and promotes the compelling state interest of "labor
peace."97

The court explained how these state interests could not be accomplished through

"significantly less restrictive means” because the benefits unions provide to Minnesota's public
employees are already tailored to minimize First Amendment speech and associational harms
because non-members are not required to join the union or to pay agency fees. 98
The onslaught continued in 2019 when Katherine Miller, a Washington childcare provider,
challenged the authorization of the Service Employees International Union Local 925 (SEIU) to
act as the exclusive collective bargaining representative for Washington's publicly subsidized
childcare providers by claiming an infringement of her First Amendment rights of free speech and
association.99

The court explained that, following Knight, every circuit court to address the

constitutionality of exclusive bargaining arrangements (as distinct from the constitutionality of
compelling financial support for such bargaining arrangements) has concluded that these
provisions do not violate the First Amendment.100 However, the court went on to leave the door
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open for future claims by pointing out the incongruity between the Supreme Court’s holdings
Knight and Janus. It expounded that the Supreme Court has directed that courts should
[L]eav[e] to [the Supreme] Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions,
and follow direct[ly] applica[ble] precedent, even if subsequent decisions call into
question some of that precedent's rationale. Consistent with that directive, we
apply Knight's more directly applicable precedent and hold that Washington's
authorization of an exclusive bargaining representative does not infringe
Miller's First Amendment rights.101
ii. Unions’ First Amendment claims against mandatory exclusive representation of nonmembers.
In Sweeney v. Madigan, Plaintiffs James M. Sweeney and the International Union of
Operating Engineers, Local 150, AFL-CIO, brought an action alleging that a portion of the Illinois
Public Labor Relations Act violates their First and Fifth Amendment rights in light of the Supreme
Court's ruling in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees.102
Under the IPLRA, a labor union may become the "exclusive representative" for the employees of
a particular bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining and in exchange, exclusive
representatives must represent all public employees in a bargaining unit, including those who are
not union members.103

The plaintiffs contend that, as a result of Janus, the agency fees

incorporated into the IPLRA are no longer enforceable but, because the duty to provide fair
representation to non-members remains enforceable, Plaintiffs are compelled to speak on behalf
of non-members, infringing on their First Amendment rights.104 Viewing the argument from the
standpoint of the plaintiffs, the court admitted that,
[A]lthough it may be true that nothing has changed except for the Supreme Court's
decision in Janus, that decision altered the nature of the plaintiffs' preexisting
101
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statutory obligations and created the imminent constitutional injury alleged to exist
here. This injury is sufficient to establish both that standing exists and that there is
a dispute ripe for resolution with respect to the plaintiffs' claims arising directly
from their duty of representation.”105

And so, it seemed, a First Amendment claim presented from the perspective of the union
had succeeded where those from non-members had failed. What effect this decision will ultimately
have on the constitutionality of exclusive representation, and whether it will benefit the unions
espousing it, remains to be seen. Some light was shed on the thinking behind the union’s strategy
when Local 150 published an article on its website lauding the victory:
On Wednesday, February 6, Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman issued an opinion
allowing Local 150’s Sweeney vs. Madigan to move forward, rejecting the Illinois
Attorney General’s motion to dismiss. This lawsuit seeks to remove the statutory
obligation for unions to provide services to “free-riders” in the wake of
the Janus decision. It is Local 150’s position that it is unconstitutional to force
unions and their dues-paying members to cover representational costs for workers
who choose to pay nothing to the union…. This opinion reaffirms our position that
we cannot, should not and will not be forced to represent workers who choose to
pay nothing.106
While the prediction that Janus’ decision would open the floodgates of union desertion did
not come to pass, it is still uncertain whether the novel nuance of unions’ refusal to represent or
bargain for non-members will bring about the same result.107
iii. Solutions sought through state legislation
In the aftermath of Janus, many strong union states have passed legislation in an attempt
to ameliorate the effects on union membership and finances. One of the most successful tactics
has been early access to new employees during their orientation, which has helped to increase
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membership and ensure a more unified and committed association.108 California and other prounion states have gone so far as to enact legislation which gives unions access to new employees
outside the watchful gaze of their employers in order to speak freely of the risks of independent
representation.109
Unions have also gained access through legislation to employee information such as emails
and mailing addresses in order to counteract efforts by anti-union leagues which seek to discourage
membership.110 Anti-union organizations such as the Freedom Foundation engage in massive
letter-writing campaigns to convince potential employees to forego membership. 111 Unfortunately
for unions, these efforts have been successful in strong “right to work” states; the Freedom
Foundation alone has helped to bring about a “25 percent reduction in dues-paying membership of
the Washington Federation of State Employees, a 26 percent drop in membership of Oregon’s
Service Employees International Union Local 503, and decline of 31 percent of members for the
Oregon School Employees Association.”112 As a result of these efforts, unions have fought hard
not only to gain access to employee information, but to prevent anti-union organizations from
obtaining access to public sector employees. 113 Following Janus, the fate of public sector unions
has not been as bleak as initially anticipated, with public sector membership merely dropping by
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.3% between 2018 and 2019.114 However, unions’ ability to stave off a doomsday scenario is
largely dependent on retaining their exclusive bargaining rights.

Part V: What Does the Future Hold
A. The Heightened Scrutiny Standard Applied
The Court refused to apply the strict scrutiny standard in Janus, claiming it was
unnecessary because the claim could not survive the more lenient “exacting” scrutiny test. 115
However, as previously established, the Court alluded to the fact that the heightened scrutiny
standard was the appropriate test.116 It has insisted that when the government wishes to carry out
a permissible goal, and has a variety of effective means to do so, “if the First Amendment means
anything, it means that regulating speech must be a last—not first— resort.”117 Thus, when
protected speech is involved, it requires any such regulations to “promote a compelling interest”
and use “the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest.”118
Two all-important questions remain: (1) does exclusive representation qualify as
compelled speech or association; and (2) if the heightened scrutiny standard is applied, will the
government’s interest in “labor peace” qualify as a “compelling interest?” The answers, thus far,
prove elusive. While Janus failed to discuss exclusive bargaining rights,119 the Court’s review of
the government’s interests in requiring agency fees summarily declared them outdated and
uncompelling.120 Significantly, the reasoning in Janus, which outlawed agency fees, relied heavily
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on the benefits unions receive as their units’ exclusive representatives in order to shoot down the
unions’ and states’ claims as uncompelling.121 The Court also made note of the power unions gain
by exclusively representing members and non-members alike in grievance and disciplinary
procedures.122 Thus, even though the Court fought to separate the issues, the unconstitutionality
of the one was based on the presence of the other. So now, it begs asking if the remaining pillar
of collective bargaining can survive without the added support of constitutional agency fees. If,
in the Supreme Court’s own words, the heightened scrutiny standard leads "to almost certain legal
condemnation"123 because, under this standard, "[i]f a less restrictive alternative would serve the
Government's purpose, the legislature must use that alternative"124 it bears to reason that exclusive
bargaining may well join agency fees in going the way of the dodo. The decision will hinge on
whether a state’s interest in negotiating its labor contracts solely with a representative of a unit’s
majority is compelling and narrowly tailored.125
The Court in Knight spoke decidedly on the constitutionality of exclusive bargaining when
it reversed the district court’s holding "that appellees had been unconstitutionally denied an
opportunity to participate in their public employer's making of policy."126 In light of the Eighth
Circuit’s commentary in Bierman that Janus "arguably undermines some of [Knight's]
reasoning"127 the constitutional argument has been put forth that the Supreme Court should
overturn its decision in Knight altogether.128 However, in order to succeed, a convincing analogy
would have to be made between compelled speech, which Janus argues triggers heightened
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scrutiny, and compelled association, which is allegedly violated by exclusive representation.129
Some believe that given the connection between exclusive representation and associational
interests, “it would be difficult to square applying rational scrutiny to exclusive representation.”130
It is interesting to posit what compelling interest the government could present in a case
challenging the constitutionality of exclusive bargaining based on the heightened scrutiny
standard. It is possible the government could make a case that the time, money, and energy spent
negotiating with multiple bargaining units and handing multiple units’ grievances would be too
great, thus leaving the status quo of unions’ right to exclusivity intact. 131 Taken to the extreme,
employers may be forced to negotiate with hundreds, perhaps thousands, of individual workers,
which most employers lack the ability and capacity to do.132 This argument, more so than those
against “free-riders,” seems to embody the interest of “labor peace” presented in Abood and has a
stronger chance of achieving the coveted status of a “compelling government interest.”133
However, that potential government interest is dangerously close to the concept of “administrative
convenience” which includes the saving of money, the avoidance of difficult fact situations, the
prevention of fraudulent claims, the application of laws with uniformity and consistency, and the
hiring and placement of employees with uniformity and consistency.134 The danger lies in the fact
that “administrative convenience” has repeatedly failed as providing an adequate government
interest against First Amendment claims and “has passed judicial scrutiny consistently only under
the rational basis test.”135 So, while it may have passed muster under the “exacting” scrutiny
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standard previously applied to First Amendment claims against exclusive bargaining rights, the
states would be wise, in light of Janus, to dig for an interest that has a chance of surviving
heightened scrutiny.
Despite the Circuit Courts’ obvious inability to overturn Supreme Court precedent, the
Supreme Court itself does not seem keen to revisit public unions’ bargaining rights. 136 When faced
with the logical claim that, following Janus, a strict standard should be applied in First Amendment
cases, the Supreme Court declined without comment, as is customary, both Uradnik and Bierman’s
petitions for certiorari to consider the constitutionality of public unions' exclusive representation
rights.137 On August 25, 2020, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld Ohio’s exclusive
bargaining law for reasons similar to those expressed by the courts in Bierman and Uradnik,
acknowledging that while Knight is in conflict with Janus, it was not overruled.138 It remains to
be seen whether the plaintiff, Jade Thompson will appeal to the Supreme Court and seek what
would constitute a landmark victory against the Marietta Education Association. Now that the
Senate has confirmed Amy Coney Barrett to the Supreme Court, it has cemented its conservative
majority and leaves open the opportunity for the more conservative Court to explore the heightened
scrutiny standard as applied to exclusive bargaining rights under the First Amendment. 139 And so,
despite the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in Bierman and Uradnik, “there is likely to
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continue to be a steady stream of challenges to exclusive representation on First Amendment
grounds until the Court does grant similar petitioners a hearing.”140
However, it is in no way a done deal that exclusive representation will eventually run afoul
of the First Amendment, and the Supreme Court may well continue to view the situation exactly
as it did in Knight: no level of scrutiny need be applied because there is no violation to begin with.
A different conclusion to draw from the Janus opinion would be that it strengthens, not weakens,
the argument that exclusive representation is constitutional because non-members are no longer
financially connected to the unions who bargain for them. 141 The idea that unions are compelling
speech on behalf of non-members vanishes into thin air – unless merely being a part of the
bargaining unit itself could somehow be construed as material support.142 In fact, an obvious
interpretation of both Knight and Janus would be that while forcing individuals to pay for an
organization they are not a part of is unconstitutional, that organization’s existence as the
representative of a unit is not.

The First Amendment protects the democratic ideals of

representation, speech, and association alike143 and the issues raised by critics of exclusive
representation can be construed as criticisms of representative democracy itself. 144 When viewed
in this light, bargaining units themselves are analogous to congressional districts and
representation by a union official one did not vote for is no different than representation in
Congress by a representative one did not vote for. 145 Critics of this argument protest its invalidity
based on governments serving as natural monopolies and unions’ designations as private

140

Baranowski, supra note 128, at 2274.
Baranowski, supra note 128, at 2294.
142 Baranowski, supra note 128, at 2294-95.
143 Baranowski, supra note 128, at 2283.
144 Baranowski, supra note 128, at 2292.
145 Baranowski, supra note 128, at 2293.
141

26

associations.146

Meanwhile, the Court in Knight clearly embraces the former ideology that

exclusive representation "is inherent in our system of government; it does not create an
unconstitutional inhibition on associational freedom."147

B. Problems for Unions: The Members-Only Approach
In light of the recent Supreme Court ruling in Janus and the subsequent attack on exclusive
representation, unions and members are looking to possible solutions to a potentially disastrous
future.148 Some believe in a members-only approach where unions get rid of the rule of exclusive
representation altogether.149 This would mean that workers who opt out of the union would not
pay any fees, would no longer be covered by the terms of the union-negotiated collective
bargaining agreement, and would then be free to negotiate individually against their employer for
terms and conditions of employment.150 While those who oppose exclusive representation may
see this as a solution, it would depend largely on whether individual employees’ requests and
negotiations with their employers had satisfactory outcomes.151 This is likely an even more
catastrophic outcome for unions because “the only thing potentially worse for a union than
ambivalence among workers to paying dues is affirmative competition over dues from other unions
who claim to be better able to represent worker interests.”152 Demonstrably, the millions of public
employees in the twenty-eight states already prohibiting agency fees (cited in Janus as proof that
labor would not be de-stabilized by the Court’s decision) have long been subsidized by dues
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collected from members in states and territories that allow fair share fees.153 From a public policy
perspective, a regime change such as this, within the public sector, would necessitate extensive
statutory changes pertaining to both employers and unions’ duties to bargain and fair
representation.154 Most significantly it would require amending current law to “clarify whether it
is unlawful discrimination on the basis of union membership if the employer negotiates different
terms with the union than with non-union employees, or different terms with different unions.”155
Some unions are hesitant to jump on board the members-only bandwagon because instances of
successful representation could be a way to convince anti-union employees to re-enlist.*
Furthermore, unions wish to avoid the danger of contractual language interpretation by individual
employees in grievance proceedings which could lead to the enforcement of such an interpretation
against the entire membership.156
In states that embrace the members-only approach, the outlook for union sustainability is
grim. In Tennessee, where members-only representation has been in effect since 2011, districts
allow separate representation for entities that receive more than 15 percent of the vote. 157 This
system enables Tennessee districts to drag out negotiations past the expiration date of the contract
so that it can set consistent terms across the board for all the represented groups, therefore
frustrating the purpose of both true collective bargaining and the members-only approach.158 In
Wisconsin, school districts have begun individual bargaining and are now offering signing bonuses
as well as higher salaries to qualified teachers they hope to lure away from other districts. 159 The
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ultimate effects of a system such as this will be an increasing inequality among schools and an
inability on the part of the states and districts to improve the quality of education in struggling
schools.160
A conservative think tank supporting right-to-work legislation and litigation gathered data
showing that 74,266 Florida state government employees are covered by collective bargaining
agreements but only 7,689 of them, or 10.4%, have authorized payment of membership dues by
payroll deduction.161 An amendment to Florida’s public sector labor relations statute that took
effect July 1, 2018 requires teacher unions to certify the percentage of bargaining unit employees
who are members and subsequently decertifies unions where fewer than half of the bargaining unit
enrolls.162 However, a group of Florida teachers who are represented by an exclusive bargaining
representative, but who are not members of the union, have sued, alleging that the new requirement
violates the right-to-work provision of the Florida Constitution by coercing those who support
union representation of non-members into becoming members of the union in order to ensure the
union itself does not lose its certification.163
Another possible outcome to an overturning of Knight would be the government stepping
in to cover the costs of bargaining in order to maintain stability and efficiency among public
employers and their employees.164 This would, arguably, eliminate some concerns on both sides:
unions would not have to fear losing funds from individuals exiting the membership and nonmembers would not be required to make any payments to the union to which they object.165
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However, those claiming First Amendment violations as a result of exclusive bargaining are
unlikely to find this an acceptable outcome for two reasons: first, it does not solve the problem of
associational rights; the union would still be conducting negotiations for the unit, and second, the
money to cover the costs of negotiations would come from a reduction in employee salaries.166
Direct government reimbursement also strikes at the heart of union independence. State and local
governments would be funding unions to sit as their direct counterparties in negotiations,
arbitrations, and grievances, which would muddy the waters and complicate unions’ main
objective to serve the interests of its membership. 167 A potential outcome such as this would fly
in the face of the purpose of the National Labor Relations Act altogether which is to prohibit
employers from "dominat[ing] or interfer[ing] with the . . . administration of any labor organization
or contribut[ing] financial or other support to it."168
Economic theory suggests that the ultimate effect of unions losing their certifications and
suffering an increasing loss in membership fees and subsidies from union-strong states will be that
the quality of representation declines everywhere.169 If unions lose their exclusive bargaining
rights, as a former organizing director for the American Federation of Teachers once observed,
“make no mistake . . . another organization will come along to recruit the workers who are left out
by promising better benefits or an alternative approach to seeking improvements on the job.”170
The potential outcome is no laughing matter for unions, and so, perhaps it is better if they do not
make First Amendment arguments against “free-riders” in alignment with the petitioners in
Sweeney. After Republican lawmakers in Tennessee implemented a labor-law reform recognizing
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competing unions, one local Tennessee Education Association’s lead negotiator observed that
“[t]he free[riders] were something we griped about for years . . . . [T]hat was a big complaint, but
looking back, I would take the free[riders] in a heartbeat to have the right to exclusive
representation again.”171

Conclusion
This comment provided an in-depth analysis of the potential likelihood of the Supreme
Court’s overturing of unions’ exclusive bargaining rights in the wake of Janus v. AFSCME. In the
decades leading up to the Janus decision, the Court had applied the less stringent exacting scrutiny
standard against First Amendment claims challenging the constitutionality of agency fees and
exclusive bargaining rights. The precedent set in Abood established that agency fees could survive
a First Amendment-based attack because the government’s interest in maintaining stable labor
relations was strong enough to overcome the alleged violations of free speech and free association.
However, in Janus, the Court not only completely overruled its previous decision in Abood by
ruling that agency fees were unconstitutional violations of free speech and association when held
up to exacting scrutiny, it further established the appropriate constitutional test to be the heightened
scrutiny standard. While the Court chose not to apply the stricter standard, Justice Alito’s majority
opinion made clear that measures compelling speech are as threatening as those restricting speech.
Courts and plaintiffs across the country took this to mean that exclusive bargaining, which
arguably compels speech by non-union members, may also be determined unconstitutional.
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This comment outlined how, following Janus, the lower courts have been tied up with
litigation concerning the implications for exclusive bargaining rights and the potential for the
landmark Knight decision to be overturned. While the Supreme Court has thus far decided not to
grant certiorari to any of the appeals from the lower courts, the apparent conflict between its
reasoning in Janus and that in Knight will, most likely, have to be addressed in the near future.
This comment also discusses the potentially disastrous effect the overruling of Knight would have
on public sector unions. Whether intentional or not, the loss of unions’ right to exclusively bargain
would leave members and non-members alike at the mercy of individually negotiated employment
contracts, a situation the public sector has not been subjected to for over forty years.
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